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INTERPOL

INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization, with 187 member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime.
INTERPOL aims to facilitate international police co-operation even where diplomatic relations do not exist between particular countries. Action is taken within the limits of existing laws in different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. INTERPOL’s constitution prohibits ‘any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.’
INTERPOL’s Leadership
The President of INTERPOL and the Secretary General work closely together in providing strong leadership and direction to the Organization.
Interpol acronym for the International Criminal Police Organization, a worldwide clearinghouse for police information. Conceived in 1914, Interpol was formally established in 1923 with headquarters at Vienna. In 1938, it was effectively disbanded by Hitler's Anschluss of Austria. After World War II, the agency was reconstituted (1946) with headquarters in Paris. Its principal services are to provide its 184 member nations with information on the whereabouts of international criminals, to organize seminars on scientific crime detection, and to facilitate the apprehension of criminals, although it does not apprehend criminals directly. The organization claims to avoid those crimes that deal with political, military, religious, or racial matters. Interpol has been most successful with regard to counterfeiting, forgery, smuggling, and the narcotics trade.

Interpol has actively been involved for a number of years in combating Information Technology Crime. Rather than ‘re-inventing the wheel’, the Interpol General Secretariat has harnessed the expertise of its members in the field of Information Technology Crime (ITC) through the vehicle of a ‘working party’ or a group of experts. In this instance, the working party consists of the heads or experienced members of national computer crime units. These working parties have been designed to reflect regional expertise and exist in Europe, Asia, America and in Africa. All working parties are in different stages of development. It should be noted that the work done by the working parties is not Interpol’s only contribution to combating ITC, but it certainly represents the most noteworthy contribution to date.

KGB

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
The basic organizational structure of the KGB was created in 1954, when the reorganization of the police apparatus was carried out. In the late 1980s, the KGB remained a highly centralized institution, with controls implemented by the Politburo through the KGB headquarters in Moscow.
Structure
The KGB was originally designated as a "state committee attached to the Council of Ministers." On July 5, 1978, a new law on the Council of Ministers changed the status of the KGB, along with that of several other state committees, so that its chairman was a member of the Council of Ministers by law. According to the 1977 Soviet Constitution, the Council of Ministers "coordinates and directs" the work of the ministries and state committees, including the KGB. In practice, however, the KGB had more autonomy than most other government bodies and operated with a large degree of independence from the Council of Ministers. The situation was similar with the Supreme Soviet, which had formal authority over the Council of Ministers and its agencies. In 1989 the actual powers of the Supreme Soviet, however, gave it little if any power over KGB operations.
The KGB was a union-republic state committee, controlling corresponding state committees of the same name in the fourteen non-Russian republics. (All-union ministries and state committees, by contrast, did not have corresponding branches in the republics but executed their functions directly through Moscow.) Below the republic level, there existed KGB administrations (upravleniia) in the kraia (see Glossary) and oblasts (see Glossary). In the Russian Republic, however, there was no separate KGB. Oblast KGB administrations in the Russian Republic were subordinated directly to the central KGB offices in Moscow. At the lower levels, autonomous okruga (see Glossary), cities, and raiony (see Glossary) had KGB departments or sections.
The KGB also had a broad network of special departments in all major government institutions, enterprises, and factories. They generally consisted of one or more KGB representatives, whose purpose was to ensure the observance of security regulations and to monitor political sentiments among employees. The special departments recruited informers to help them in their tasks. A separate and very extensive network of special departments existed within the armed forces and defense-related institutions.
Although a union-republic agency, the KGB was highly centralized and was controlled rigidly from the top. The KGB central staff kept a close watch over the operations of its branches, leaving the latter minimal autonomous authority over policy or cadre selection. Moreover, local government organs had little involvement in local KGB activities. Indeed, the high degree of centralization in the KGB was reflected in the fact that regional KGB branches were not subordinated to the local soviets (see Glossary), but only to the KGB hierarchy. Thus, they differed from local branches of most union-republic ministerial agencies, such as the MVD, which were subject to dual subordination.
The KGB was directed by a chairman--who was formally appointed by the Supreme Soviet but actually was selected by the Politburo-- one or two first deputy chairmen, and several (usually four to six) deputy chairmen. Key decisions were made by the KGB Collegium, which was a collective leadership body composed of the chairman, deputy chairmen, chiefs of certain KGB directorates, and one or two chairmen of republic KGB organizations.

CIA

About CIA
The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 47 w ith the signing of the National Security Act by President Harry S. Truman. The act also created a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to serve as head of the United States intelligence community; act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security; and serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amended the National Security Act to provide for a Director of National Intelligence who would assume some of the roles formerly fulfilled by the DCI, with a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Leon E. Panetta became Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on February 13, 2009.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency serves as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and reports to the Director of National Intelligence. The CIA director's responsibilities include:
• Collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that he shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions;
• Correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence;
• Providing overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the Intelligence Community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensuring that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection; and
• Performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct.
The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the responsibilities outlined above.
To accomplish its mission, the CIA engages in research, development, and deployment of high-leverage technology for intelligence purposes. As a separate agency, CIA serves as an independent source of analysis on topics of concern and also works closely with the other organizations in the Intelligence Community to ensure that the intelligence consumer—whether Washington policymaker or battlefield commander—receives the best intelligence possible.
As changing global realities have reordered the national security agenda, CIA has met these challenges by:
• Creating special, multidisciplinary centers to address such high-priority issues such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, international organized crime and narcotics trafficking, environment, and arms control intelligence.
• Forging stronger partnerships between the several intelligence collection disciplines and all-source analysis.
• Taking an active part in Intelligence Community analytical efforts and producing all-source analysis on the full range of topics that affect national security.
• Contributing to the effectiveness of the overall Intelligence Community by managing services of common concern in imagery analysis and open-source collection and participating in partnerships with other intelligence agencies in the areas of research and development and technical collection.
By emphasizing adaptability in its approach to intelligence collection, the CIA can tailor its support to key intelligence consumers and help them meet their needs as they face the issues of the post-Cold War World.
Strategic Intent 2007-2011

BSF

Border Security Forces
The Border Security Force (BSF) is responsible for guarding India's land borders during peacetime and prevent trans-border crimes. BSF has an extensive intelligence network to support these missions. The BSF was established on 01 December 1965, following Pakistani intrusions in the Rann of Kutch earlier that year. The total strength of the BSF is approsimately 180,000.
Nearly, one third of the BSF is deployed in Jammu & Kashmir. As part of its occupation of Kashmir, the Indian Government has deployed more than half a million soldiers and a quarter of a million paramilitary forces. Beginning in 1990 the Indian central government deployed the full range of paramilitary forces to Kashmir, as the Army was unwilling to commit its forces to the counter-insurgency operation. The BSF had never been committed tor this type of operation. The BSF transforme itself from a border force to a counter-insurgency formation, and established an intelligence network in the area. However, more units of the force were deployed without the required specialised equipment and training.
Allegations of human rights violations in Kashmir primarily implicate the BSF. The first three years of BSF search, cordon, detention and killings produced an increase in the incidence violence in the Valley. Overused personnel committed excesses, including unacknowledged detentions, "disappearances" and other human rights violations. Torture is practised to coerce detainees to reveal information about suspected militants or to confess to militant activity. It is also used to punish detainees who are believed to support or sympathize with militants. Security legislation authorizes the security forces to shoot to kill and to destroy civilian property, increasing the likelihood of abuses.
By the beginning of 1995, over 400,000 troops were reportedly deployed in Kashmir, including eight army divisions and other independent brigades across the state. At least fifty-six of 148 battalions of Border Security Forces - each including one thousand men - are engaged in Kashmir. Thirty-nine in the valley and seven in Doda District are involved in counter-insurgency operations, and ten along the line of control are involved in border security operations.
Security forces committed an estimated 100-200 extrajudicial killings of suspected militants in Jammu and Kashmir during 1997. Although well-documented evidence to corroborate cases and quantify trends is lacking, most observers believe that the number of killings attributed to regular Indian forces declined slightly from the previous year. According to press reports and anecdotal accounts, those killed typically had been detained by security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple bullet wounds and often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or were otherwise discovered the same day or a few days later.
Impunity has been and remains a serious problem in Jammu and Kashmir. Security forces have committed thousands of serious human rights violations over the course of the conflict, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Yet, during the period January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1997, only ten members of the security forces were tried and sentenced to 10 or more years imprisonment for violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab.
Civilian deaths caused by security forces in 1997 diminished for the fourth consecutive year in Jammu and Kashmir. This decrease apparently is due to press scrutiny and public criticism of abuses in previous years, increased training of military and paramilitary forces in humanitarian law, and greater sensitivity of commanders to rule of law issues. The security forces have not abandoned the abduction and extrajudicial execution of suspected militants, nor accepted accountability for these abuses. However, the inclination of many commanders to distance their units from such practices has led to reduced participation in them and a transfer of some of such actions to countermilitants.
Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by progovernment countermilitants, believed to operate under the direction of the Border Security Forces, continue as a significant pattern in Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants are former separatist militants who have surrendered to government forces but have retained their arms and paramilitary organization. Although precise numbers are unavailable, progovernment countermilitants may have committed 100 to 200 extrajudicial killings in Jammu and Kashmir during 1997. Human rights groups believed that the number was slightly lower than in 1996. Government agencies fund, exchange intelligence with, and direct operations of countermilitants as part of the counterinsurgency effort. Countermilitants are known to screen passersby at roadblocks and guard extensive areas of the Kashmir Valley from attacks by militants. In sponsoring and condoning countermilitant activity, which takes place outside the legal system, the Government cannot avoid responsibility for killings, abductions, and other abuses committed by these irregulars. Perhaps as many as 3,000 continue to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in the countryside, outside major towns. During 1997 the Government took steps to organize Kashmiri counter-militants as a battalion in the paramilitary forces as a means of bringing them under enhanced control and military discipline.
In Punjab the pattern of disappearances prevalent in the early 1990's appears to be at an end. Hundreds of police and security officials have not been held accountable for serious human rights abuses committed during the counterinsurgency of 1984-94. However, steps have been taken against a few such violators. The CBI actively is pursuing charges against dozens of police officials implicated in the "mass cremations" case. Police in the Tarn Taran district secretly disposed of bodies of suspected militants believed to have been abducted and extrajudicially executed, cremating them without the knowledge or consent of their families. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has reported that 984 unidentified bodies were cremated by Punjab police in Tarn Taran. Most reportedly were killed by Border Security Forces while trying to cross into India from Pakistan, were unidentified victims of accidents or suicide, or died in clashes between militant factions. However, 424 were apparently militants killed in the interior of the district, 291 of whom were subsequently identified. These numbers demonstrate the extent of the bloodshed during those years and, given the pattern of police abuses prevalent during the period, credibly include many killed in extrajudicial executions.
Under the auspices of the UN and with USG encouragement, counternarcotic officials of India and Pakistan have continued the cooperation begun in 1994. Indian and Pakistani officials met three times in 1995 and agreed to speedy exchange of information and contacts. Narcotics representatives also participate in the quarterly meetings between the Indian Border Security Force and the Pakistani Rangers. Few tangible results have yet come out of these meetings
At times of general elections to Lok Sabha and to the Legislative Assemblies, the State Governments generally seek assistance of the Central Government Offices and Departments located in the States for deployment of their employees in connection with the conduct of elections. The civil employees of Central para-military forces like the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force may also be required for such election duty.

CRPF

Central Reserve Police Force
The Central Reserve Police Force, established under the Central Reserve Police Force Act of 1949 (66 of 1949), includes some 165,000 personnel organized into 70 battalions, including seven rapid action battalions and two women battalions. The force is lightly armed and deployable throughout the country, serving as a back-up for the State Police should situations get out of control. Though initially created to respond to riots and civil disorder, orver time the Force has become involved in counter-insurgency operations for they have proven poorly prepared.
At times of general elections to Lok Sabha and to the Legislative Assemblies, the State Governments generally seek assistance of the Central Government Offices and Departments located in the States for deployment of their employees in connection with the conduct of elections. The civil employees of Central para-military forces like the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force may also be required for such election duty.

CISF

Central Industrial Security Force
The Home Ministry's Central Industrial Security Force, established under the Central Industrial Security Force Act of 1968 (50 of 1968), consists of some 90,000 personnel who guard public-sector areas. The Central Industrial Security Force is responsible for security services at ports and other transportation facilities, as well as various other facilities, such as the new mint situated at Cherlapally on the out skirts of Hyderabad.
The Central Industrial Security Force has been reported to have encountered problems with official corruption, as well as having been implicated in human rights abuses which harmed peasant communities in rural India. In 1996 the Madras Port Trust board approved a plan for disbanding the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) at the Madras port, and creating the port's own security force by either borrowing from the State police force or by recruiting directly or by other means. However the government has recently passed a law stating that all the government-run institutions, including Public Sector Undertakings [PSUs], are required to employ guards from Central Industrial Security Force.
At times of general elections to Lok Sabha and to the Legislative Assemblies, the State Governments generally seek assistance of the Central Government Offices and Departments located in the States for deployment of their employees in connection with the conduct of elections. The civil employees of Central para-military forces like the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force may also be required for such election duty.
S

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARDS

National Security Guards
Black Cat Commandos
The National Security Guards [NSG], established under the National Security Guard Act of 1986 (Act 47 of 1986), is India's premier counter-terrorist force. The NSG provides security to VIP's, conducts anti-sabotage checks, and is responsible for neutralizing terrorist threats to vital installations. Its missions include engaging terrorists in specific situations, responding to piracy in the air and on the land, and rescuing hostages in kidnap situations.
The NSG strength of around 7500 personnel is evenly divided between the Special Action Group (SAG) and the Special Rangers Group (SRG). The SAG is the offensive wing, with the members drawn from the Indian Army. The SRG, with members from central police organizations, supports the SAF in isolating target areas.
NSG was established following the 1984 Operational Bluestar that caused widespread damage in the Golden Temple complex. Shortcomings in that operational indicated the need for a special force for executing such operations with greater precision. The NSG has been deployed on only a few occasions, including Operation Black Thunder I & II in the Amritsar Golden Temple complex in 1988, and the Operation Ashwamedh storming of a hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft at Amritsar airport on 24 April 1994.
As part of its occupation of Kashmir, the Indian Government has deployed more than half a million soldiers and a quarter of a million paramilitary forces, including significant elements of the National Security Guards. While Indian forces have allegedly committed excesses, including torture, extrajudicial executions, disappearances, willful destruction of property and forced displacement in Kashmir, NSG personnel have not been prominently implicated in these activities.

RAW

Research and Analysis Wing [RAW]
The Research and Analysis Wing [RAW] is India's foreign intelligence agency. RAW has become an effective instrument of Indian national power, and has assumed a significant role in carrying out India's domestic and foreign policies. RAW has engaged in espionage against Pakistan and other neighboring countries. It has enjoyed the backing of successive Indian governments in these efforts. Working directly under the Prime Minister, the structure and operations of the Research & Analysis Wing are kept secret from Parliament.
Founded in 1968, RAW focused largely on Pakistan. Its formation was initially motivated by reports of Pakistan supplying weapons to Sikh militants, and providing shelter and training to guerrillas in Pakistan.
Numerous missions were assigned to RAW upon its creation. These included monitoring political and military developments in neighboring countries that affects Indian national security. Consequently, considerable attention is paid by RAW to Pakistan and China, countries that are traditional rivals of India.
RAW has evolved from its origins as a part of the Intelligence Bureau to develop into India's predominant intelligence organization. In 1968, RAW had 250 agents and a budget of Rs. 2 crore. This has expanded to a 2000 total of an estimated eight to ten thousand agents and a budget that experts place at Rs. 1500 crore, alternately estimated at $145 million.
Pakistan has accused the Research and Analysis Wing of sponsoring sabotage in Punjab, where RAW is alleged to have supported the Seraiki movement, providing financial support to promote its activities in Pakistan and organizing an International Seraiki Conference in Delhi in November-December 1993. RAW has an extensive network of agents and anti-government elements within Pakistan, including dissident elements from various sectarian and ethnic groups of Sindh and Punjab. Published reports in Pakistan allege that as many as 35,000 RAW agents entered Pakistan between 1983-93, with 12,000 working in Sindh, 10,000 in Punjab, 8,000 in North West Frontier Province and 5000 in Balochistan.
RAW has a long history of activity in Bangladesh, supporting both secular forces and the area's Hindu minority. The involvement of RAW in East Pakistan is said to date from the 1960s, when RAW supported Mujibur Rahman, leading up to his general election victory in 1970. RAW also provided training and arms to the Bangladeshi freedom fighters known as Mukti Bahini. RAW's aid was instrumental in Bangladesh's gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971.
During the course of its investigation the Jain Commission received testimony on the official Indian support to the various Sri Lankan Tamil armed groups in Tamil Nadu. From 1981, RAW and the Intelligence Bureau established a network of as many as 30 training bases for these groups in India. Centers were also established at the high-security military installation of Chakrata, near Dehra Dun, and in the Ramakrishna Puram area of New Delhi. This clandestine support to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), some of whom were on the payroll of RAW, was later suspended. Starting in late 1986 the Research and Analysis Wing focused surveillance on the LTTE which was expanding ties with Tamil Nadu separatist groups. Rajiv Gandhi sought to establish good relations with the LTTE, even after the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] experience in Sri Lanka. But the Indian intelligence community failed to accurately assess the character of the LTTE and its orientation India and its political leaders. The LTTE assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was apparently motivated by fears of a possible re-induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka and a crackdown on the LTTE network in Tamil Nadu.
RAW was heavily criticized in 1999, following the Pakistani incursions at Kargil. Critics accused RAW of failing to provide intelligence that could have prevented the ensuing ten-week conflict that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of full-scale war. While the army has been critical of the lack of information they received, RAW has pointed the finger at the politicians, claiming they had provided all the necessary information. Most Indian officials believe that in order to prevent another such occurrence, communication needs to be increased between the intelligence agencies, which would require structural reform.
Most recently, RAW has gained attention for providing the US with intelligence on Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets for the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Maps and photographs of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with other evidence implicating Osama bin Laden in terrorist attacks, were given to US intelligence officials.
* * *
The objectives of RAW include:
To monitor the political and military developments in adjoining countries, which have direct bearing on India's national security and in the formulation of its foreign policy.
To seek the control and limitation of the supply of military hardware to Pakistan, mostly from European countries, the USA and China.
The chief of the RAW is designated Secretary (Research) in the Cabinet Secretariat, which is part of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Most of the position's occupants have been experts on either Pakistan or China. The head of the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), the external intelligence agency, enjoys greater autonomy of functioning than their counterparts in the UK and US and has the same privileged direct access to the Prime Minister as their UK counterparts. The control of the Cabinet Secretary over the RAW is limited to administrative and financial matters, with very little say in operational and policy matters.
They also have the benefit of training in either US or the UK, and more recently in Israel. The Secretary (R) reports on an administrative basis to the Cabinet Secretary, who reports to the Prime Minister (PM). However, on a daily basis the Secretary (R) reports to the National Security Advisor. Reporting to the Secretary (R) are: Two Special Secretaries and one Special Director of the ARC, the Aviation Research Centre; Four Additional Secretaries, responsible for different geographical regions; A large number (above 40) Joint Secretaries, who are the functional heads of various desks.
The structure of the RAW is a matter of speculation, but brief overviews of the same are present in the public domain. Attached to the HQ of RAW at Lodhi Road, New Delhi are different regional headquarters, which have direct links to overseas stations and are headed by a controlling officer who keeps records of different projects assigned to field officers who are posted abroad. Intelligence is usually collected from a variety of sources by field officers and deputy field officers; it is either pre-processed (vetted) by a senior field officer or by a desk officer. The desk officer then passes the information to the Joint Secretary and then on to the Additional Secretary and from there it is disseminated to the concerned end user. The Director RAW is a member of the JIC Steering Committee and is authorized to brief the Prime Minister should the need arise.
Some officers of the RAW are members of a specialized service, the Research and Analysis Service (RAS), but several officers also serve on deputation from other services. The RAW has sub-organizations like the Aviation Research Center (ARC), the Radio Research Center (RRC) or the Electronics and Technical Service (ETS), which have considerable capacity for technical intelligence gathering. Another important branch under the operational control of the RAW is the Directorate General of Security (DGS). This agency has oversight over organizations like the Special Frontier Force (SFF), the Special Services Bureau (SSB) etc... Liaison with the military is maintained through the Military Intelligence Advisory Group and the Military Advisor to the Director RAW.
Though the RAW is primarily intended for collecting intelligence beyond India's national borders, it has over time come to have a strong presence in all fields of intelligence gathering. The RAW was brought into internal security issues during the Sikkim situation, it played a role in the events of the emergency of 1977-79, it was asked to operate in Punjab to counter-balance the presence of the ISI (and so also in Kashmir), and the RAW has provided the security for the India's nuclear program. Right from its formation in 18 September, 1968, R N Kao, the founding father of RAW, picked up the best men from within government and from outside for RAW. A combination of military, academicians, bureaucrats and policemen was a fine start for RAW which modelled itself on the lines of CIA

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

Intelligence Bureau (IB)
The Central Intelligence Bureau (IB) is reputed to be the oldest intelligence agency in the world. In the past it was tasked with all intelligence targeting but in recent times it has focused on internal security. The IB is officially under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), but in practice the Director IB (DIB) is a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and Steering Committee and has the authority to brief the Prime Minister should the need arise, but intelligence inputs (at least in theory) go through the regular channels in the MHA to the JIC.
The collection mechanisms of the IB vary depending on the region, but the IB operates both at the state level and the national level. The bulk of the intelligence collection is carried out by `Grade II' employees of the IB, i.e. in increasing order of seniority; the Security Assistants (Constable), the Junior Intelligence Officers (Head Constable), the Asst. (Central) Intelligence Officer (Sub-Inspector), Deputy Central Intelligence Officers (Inspector), and Joint Central Intelligence Officers (Superintendent of Police). The `Class I'(gazette) officers carry out coordination and higher-level management the IB. These officers are (again in increasing order of seniority) Asst. Director, the Deputy Director, Joint Director, Addl. Director, Special Director or Special Secretary and finally the Director IB. Grade II officers are in part direct recruitment and officer deputed from state police forces, but Class I officers are mostly deputed from state services.
At the state level all IB officers are part of the State Special Bureau report to a Central Intelligence Officer (the intelligence advisor to the Governor). The IB maintains a large number of field units and headquarters (which are under the control of Joint or Deputy Directors). It is through these offices and the intricate process of deputation that a very `organic' linkage between the state police agencies and the IB is maintained. In addition to these at the national level the IB has several units (in some cases Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaus) to keep track of issues like terrorism, counter-intelligence, VIP security and threat assessment, and sensitive areas (i.e. J&K, North East Region (NER) etc...).
Some of the problems within the IB are briefly listed below:
1) There are problems regarding recruiting: in the past postings and deputations with the IB were regarded as positive career choices among police officers, and this led to a favorable buildup of expertise in the both state and national law enforcement circles. In more recent times, this has changed, state police forces offer far swifter means of promotion and career advancement, also the perks of state level police postings in some cases compare more favorably than those of a central posting. The result is that people have to be forcibly deputed to the IB. This is further compounded by the fact that IB postings often involve extremely hazardous duties in hostile populations. Thus some postings go unfilled and in some cases the IB gets very thinly stretched on the ground. This leads to gaps in intelligence collection.
2) In sensitive areas (ex. J&K. NER) the pace of security operations is very high. This means that the turnaround time between collection, collation and dissemination has to be very small. IB officers serve largely in advisory capacity and have to coordinate with the regular enforcement arms. To reduce the dead time in intelligence handling, today in most sensitive areas, the law enforcement arms (in most cases) are endowed with their own intelligence units. These units do varying amounts of intelligence targeting and are in theory supposed to coordinate with the IB, sometimes however, this coordination is not achieved and quite possibly another intelligence agency dominates leading to the loss of the `overall picture'.
3) The IB is Government of India's principal internal news agency. It is responsible for monitoring all aspects of governance. As an extension of this role, it routinely monitors the state governments and often draws up independent assessments of the security situation in a state and advises the Governor. At the central level the IB closely monitors developments relating to parliamentary affairs and reports back to the Cabinet Secretariat. The Special Enquiry and Surveillance unit (SES) of the IB handles most of this work. This task is vital in maintaining the stability of elected governments. However it can easily be subverted to achieve less savory aims, especially at the state level. Apart from any actual degradation in capacity, this kind of work breeds the impression in that the IB is purely a mechanism for targeting the opposition.
4) The IB is also tasked with Counter-Intelligence operations. This area of IB work has been the object of severe criticism and almost every internal disturbance is projected as a failure in counter-intelligence (there is always talk of the absence of specificity in threat assessments). Problems related to this part are discussed more extensively in the section on counter-intelligence issues.
The task forces have in all probability made several recommendations about these topics. The task force on Internal Security has stated the need to place emphasis on the position of the Secretary (MHA) and that all intelligence regarding internal security developments should be passed to him; this is appears to be an attempt to foster the functioning of the `Core Intelligence Processing Unit' in the MHA. The task force on Internal Security has also made clear the need to create dedicated `systems and procedures' of intelligence dissemination to aid in the conduct of counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations. It is also likely that the capabilities in the IB relating to counter-intelligence are being upgraded (this is discussed in greater detail in the section on Counter-Intelligence). The task force on internal security has also called for an end to political interference in the IB, it has suggested that a internal review and oversight body be set up in the IB to stamp out this sort of thing, but it is unclear to the author as to exactly how this mechanism will function.