ARMY

In keeping with the 21st century vision of the Corps of Signals 'to achieve electronic and information superiority for effective functioning of the Indian Army', the Corps has embarked upon a multidimensional and challenging task of establishing a converged, robust, broad band and secure IT infrastructure, at peace and operational locations of the Indian Army.
A holistic approach has been adopted to develop the Communication and IT infrastructure in all its dimensions. ASCON Phase III, fully redundant and secure backbone network already implemented and presently project ASCON Phase IV is under implementation to cover voids. Also state of the art Zonal/Metro access networks have been established at a number of stations and at other locations these networks are under implementation. Simultaneously, access networks down to formation/unit level, especially in Northern, Eastern and Southern Commands, are being established based on OFC and UHF systems. Exclusive, satellite-based networks shall provide converged data and voice networks for different users which include use during aid to civil administration, especially during natural calamities.
Signals are essentially the NERVES of the Army. The nerves in our body connect the brain to the sensory organs and also to the limbs. It is through the nerves that the brain receives inputs from the various sensory organs. The processing of these inputs results in a set of commands being issued to the various limbs which execute them to provide the response that our body makes to the external stimulus. In the same manner, the Generals, being the brains of the Army, receive inputs from the troops in contact and from other sources through the Signals. These inputs are processed at the Headquarters and converted into action plans. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Signals to convey these operational plans to the troops who execute them. Therefore, it is obvious that the Signals are intimately intertwined in all aspects of the functioning of the Army both in war and in peace. Signals are present at all levels and at all places, just as we have nerves in all parts of our body.
The vision of Signals Corps is to attain and maintain informatic ascendancy by developing infostructure to cater for Network Centric Warfare in a digitized battlefield of tomorrow. The aim and objective of Signals Corps is to make the Indian Army Network Enabled Force by 2012 and Network Centric Force by 2017. This will entail consolidation of all networks so as to provide the Indian Army with an optimal, secure, reliable and robust infostructure that can meet both operational and peacetime requirements and one that is capable of withstanding technical and physical degradation. The Corps remains the lead agency and nodal centre for information and cyber security both within the Defence Services and at the National level.
The offrs at all levels are aware of the strategic, operational and tactical dimensions to enable a pragmatic application of technology in support of combat ops. Training centres are developing directives and processes that can prepare all ranks to acquire a high level of multiple skills needed in the diverse terrain, technological and op environment of our army in gen and Signals in particular. The training centres are designed to facilitate the pursuit of a continuous trg philosophy at unit level through on-the-job trg and by harnessing e-learning, thereby reducing the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots".
The momentous strides made by the Corps in the last few decades have truly been stupendous and without parallel. It has transited to a network enabled force, propelled by the intellect, sustained hard work and the inherent urge to excel which have been so vividly displayed by all officers and men. The domain of enhancing communication in the Tactical Battle Area and the facilitation of synergy of C4I2 elements are going to be the major thrust areas for the future. The Corps is forward looking, with finely honed procedures and exacting standards for execution of tasks. The Corps has always had an abiding and strong ethical foundation. With character comes reputation, and the esteem that the Corps enjoys today stems from the value system and ethos which need to be continually preserved and nurtured. The Corps has also evolved drills and procedures that ensure the provision of reliable and responsive communications to the Army under harsh terrain and tough battle field conditions and is living up to the motto of the Corps - "TEEVRA CHAUKAS" or "Swift and Secure".
In keeping with the 21st century vision of the Corps of Signals 'to achieve electronic and information superiority for effective functioning of the Indian Army', the Corps has embarked upon a multidimensional and challenging task of establishing a converged, robust, broad band and secure IT infrastructure, at peace and operational locations of the Indian Army.
A holistic approach has been adopted to develop the Communication and IT infrastructure in all its dimensions. ASCON Phase III, fully redundant and secure backbone network already implemented and presently project ASCON Phase IV is under implementation to cover voids. Also state of the art Zonal/Metro access networks have been established at a number of stations and at other locations these networks are under implementation. Simultaneously, access networks down to formation/unit level, especially in Northern, Eastern and Southern Commands, are being established based on OFC and UHF systems. Exclusive, satellite-based networks shall provide converged data and voice networks for different users which include use during aid to civil administration, especially during natural calamities.
Signals are essentially the NERVES of the Army. The nerves in our body connect the brain to the sensory organs and also to the limbs. It is through the nerves that the brain receives inputs from the various sensory organs. The processing of these inputs results in a set of commands being issued to the various limbs which execute them to provide the response that our body makes to the external stimulus. In the same manner, the Generals, being the brains of the Army, receive inputs from the troops in contact and from other sources through the Signals. These inputs are processed at the Headquarters and converted into action plans. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Signals to convey these operational plans to the troops who execute them. Therefore, it is obvious that the Signals are intimately intertwined in all aspects of the functioning of the Army both in war and in peace. Signals are present at all levels and at all places, just as we have nerves in all parts of our body.
The vision of Signals Corps is to attain and maintain informatic ascendancy by developing infostructure to cater for Network Centric Warfare in a digitized battlefield of tomorrow. The aim and objective of Signals Corps is to make the Indian Army Network Enabled Force by 2012 and Network Centric Force by 2017. This will entail consolidation of all networks so as to provide the Indian Army with an optimal, secure, reliable and robust infostructure that can meet both operational and peacetime requirements and one that is capable of withstanding technical and physical degradation. The Corps remains the lead agency and nodal centre for information and cyber security both within the Defence Services and at the National level.
The offrs at all levels are aware of the strategic, operational and tactical dimensions to enable a pragmatic application of technology in support of combat ops. Training centres are developing directives and processes that can prepare all ranks to acquire a high level of multiple skills needed in the diverse terrain, technological and op environment of our army in gen and Signals in particular. The training centres are designed to facilitate the pursuit of a continuous trg philosophy at unit level through on-the-job trg and by harnessing e-learning, thereby reducing the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots".
The momentous strides made by the Corps in the last few decades have truly been stupendous and without parallel. It has transited to a network enabled force, propelled by the intellect, sustained hard work and the inherent urge to excel which have been so vividly displayed by all officers and men. The domain of enhancing communication in the Tactical Battle Area and the facilitation of synergy of C4I2 elements are going to be the major thrust areas for the future. The Corps is forward looking, with finely honed procedures and exacting standards for execution of tasks. The Corps has always had an abiding and strong ethical foundation. With character comes reputation, and the esteem that the Corps enjoys today stems from the value system and ethos which need to be continually preserved and nurtured. The Corps has also evolved drills and procedures that ensure the provision of reliable and responsive communications to the Army under harsh terrain and tough battle field conditions and is living up to the motto of the Corps - "TEEVRA CHAUKAS" or "Swift and Secure".
The crest of the Regiment of Artillery is largely a legacy of the Royal Artillery. Their crest depicted a gun with a crown above it, separated by the world UBIQUE (Latin for everywhere). Below the gun was emblazoned the motto; Quo Fas Et Gloria Ducant; "where right and glory lead". In the Royal Indian Artillery, the crown was replaced by a star-
representing the Star of India and instead of UBIQUE the crest carried the world India to distinguish the Royal Indian Artillery from the Royal Artillery. The motto below was also changed to IZZAT-O-IQBAL. After independence, the word INDIA was dropped from the regimental crest and replaced with SARVATRA.



Regiment of Artillery History

Regimental Crest

Regimental Motto

Regimental Flag

Honours and Awards

Unit Citation



Regimental Motto
The motto, Izzat-o-Iqbal, was retained but not without controversy. In 1954, as part of the process of Indianisation of the armed forces, the government ordered that regimental mottos be changed to Hindi or Sanskrit. The final decision was, however, left with the then Chief of the Army Staff, General Rajendra Sinhji. The Regiment of Artillery made a forceful case for retaining its motto as it was felt the most suitable in content and meaning. It was finally decided to retain the motto though it was in Persian.
Regimental Flag
A distinctive red and navy blue background the official colours of the Artillery flag forms an ideal setting for the golden gun (the Gunner crest) which forms the centerpiece of the flag. Gunner folklore had it, that the red and blue represents the flash and the smoke of the gun, though this is not quite true. Red has been traditionally common to all combat arms - Infantry, Armour and Artillery. The blue in the Artillery flag was taken from the ribbon of the 'Star of India' which had been incorporated into the Artillery crest. The original colour was light blue but since a similar shade was adopted by the Crops of Signals, it was changed to navy blue to avoid confusion.
Gallantry Awards During OP Vijay
Vir Chakra
• IC-48654 Maj Amrinder Singh Kasana, 41 Fd Regt.
• SS-37033 Capt R Jery Prem Raj, 158 Med Regt (Posthumous) .
• 15119305 Gnr Sanjeev Gopala Pillai, 4 Fd Regt (Posthumous).
Yudh Seva Medal.
• IC-19063 Brig Lakhwinder Singh, Cdr 8 Mtn Arty Bde.
Sena Medal (Gallantry)
• IC-34423 Col Alok Deb, 197 Fd Regt.
• IC-36955 Col Prabhat Ranjan, 108 Med Regt.
• IC-37050 Lt Col Girish Kumar Mediratta, 1889 Lt Regt.
• IC-41803 Maj Ambrose Xavier Amalaraj, 108 Med Regt.
• IC-51498 Maj Amitabh Roy, 108 Med Regt.
• IC-50475 Capt Ganesh Bhat, 1889 Lt Regt.
• IC-50609 Capt Kamath Prashant Narayan, 1889 Lt Regt.
• IC-54099 Capt Mridul Kumar Singh, 197 Fd Regt.
• IC-54362 Capt PV Vikram, 141 Fd Regt (Posthumous).
• SS-36929 Capt Saju Cherian, 307 Med Regt.
• SS-36937 Capt Amit Sharma, 197 Fd Regt.
• IC-57422 Lt Sanjay Barshilia, 286 Med Regt.
• 14404805 Gnr Jagdish Prasad Gupta, 286 Med Regt.
Awards other than OP Vijay

Shaurya Chakra
• IC-40413 Maj Kishan Bahadur Thapa, 14 RR Bn.
Bar to Sena Medal (Gallantry)
• IC-53809 Capt Rajesh Singh Jasrotia, SM** , 167 Fd Regt.
Sena Medal (Gallantry)
• IC-49654 Maj Satyabir Shorot, 311 Fd Regt.
• IC-51034 Capt Mohan Ponna, 15 RR.
• IC-53694 Lt Anubhav Raj, 11 Fd Regt.
• IC-57497 Lt Manoj Kumar, 12 Fd Regt.
• 14491749 Nk Dalip Kumar, 168 Fd Regt.
• 14416147 Gnr T Vijay Bapu Rao, 1905 Lt Regt (Posthumous)

Unit Citation
Following units were awarded Unit Citation by the COAS for their performance in OP Vijay.
108 Med Regt. 108 Medium Regiment was raised on 01 March 81 at Bagrakot (West Bengal) by Lieutenant Colonel BJ Oberoi. In a short span of 18 years, the unit had had the distinction of serving in different areas like the East; Leh-Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir in the North along Line of Control; and, in Central India. The unit as a fledling was blooded into OPERATION MEGHDOOT in 1984. The Chief of Army Staff has made a special instant award of 'Unit Citation' to 108 Medium Regiment, for their valour and indomitable resolve during OPERATION VIJAY.

141 Field Regiment. 141 Field Regiment was raised on 01 Jul 1979 at Talbehat. The first Commanding Officer was Lieutenant Colonel Vinay Shankar. The unit has mixed class composition of troops. The unit had been awarded the COAS's 'Unit Citation' for their splendid performance during OPERATION VIJAY. Late Captain PV Vikram has been awarded Sena Medal in recognition to his gallant action during OPERATION VIJAY.
197 Field Regiment. 197 Field Regiment was raised on 01 Jun 1968 at Bangalore as a mixed unit. The first Commanding Officer was Lieutenant Colonel CS Murthy. The unit has held varying equipments like 76 mm (YUGO), 105 mm IFG, 100 mm Guns and 122 mm HOW. Besides participation in Bangladesh operations under 23 Mountain Division, the unit has served in the Eastern, Western and Northern Sectors including being a part of the strike Corps. The unit has been awarded COAS's 'Unit Citation' for their splendid performance during OP VIJAY.

Crew
3
Combat Weight
46.5t
Ground Pressure
0.87kg/cm²
Engine
4-stroke V-84ms diesel engine, 618kw (840hp)
Fuel Tanks Capacity
1,600l
Range
Paved road - 650km
Unpaved - 500km
Communications
UHF R-163-504 radio set
UHF R-163-UP radio receiver
Full specifications
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The T-90S is the latest development in the T-series of Russian tanks and represents an increase in firepower, mobility and protection. It is manufactured by Uralvagonzavod in Nizhnyi Tagil, Russia.
The T-90S entered service with the Russian Army in 1992. In February 2001, the Indian Army signed a contract for 310 T-90S tanks. 124 were completed in Russia and the rest are being delivered in 'knocked down / semi-knocked down' form for final assembly in India.
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The first of these was delivered in January 2004. The locally assembled tanks are christened 'Bhishma'. The tanks are fitted with the Shtora self-protection system and Catherine thermal imagers from Thales of France and Peleng of Belarus.
"The T-90S Russian tank represents an increase in firepower, mobility and protection."
In January 2005, it was announced that a further 91 T-90S tanks would be procured for the Russian Army, although this number was later reduced. Deliveries are underway.
By November 2007, it has been estimated that the Russian Army has around 200 T-90 tanks. In August 2007, Thales was awarded a contract to supply 100 of these with the Catherine FC thermal imager. In March 2006, Algeria signed a contract for the supply of 180 T-90S tanks from Uralvagonzavod, to be delivered by 2011.
In November 2006, India ordered a further 300 T-90 tanks, to be licence-built by heavy vehicle factory (HVF), Avadi. Production has been delayed due to technology transfer problems but is expected to begin by the end of 2008.
Armament
The T-90S armament includes one 125mm 2A46M smoothbore gun, stabilised in two axes and fitted with a thermal sleeve. The gun tube can be replaced without dismantling inside the turret. The gun can fire a variety of ammunition including APDS (Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot), HEAT (high-explosive anti-tank), HE-FRAG (high-explosive fragmentation) as well as shrapnel projectiles with time fuses.
The T-90S gun can also fire the 9M119 Refleks (NATO designation AT-11 Sniper) anti-tank guided missile system. The range of the missile is 100m to 4,000m and takes 11.7 sec to reach maximum range. The system is intended to engage tanks fitted with ERA (explosive reactive armour) as well as low-flying air targets such as helicopters, at a range of up to 5km. The missile system fires either the 9M119 or 9M119M missiles which have semi-automatic laser beamriding guidance and a hollow charge warhead. Missile weight is 23.4kg. The guns automatic loader will feed both ordnance and missiles.
Also fitted is a coaxial 7.62mm PKT machine gun and a 12.7mm air defence machine gun. A 5.45mm AKS-74 assault rifle is carried on a storage rack.
Self protection
The T-90 tank is protected by both conventional armour-plating and explosive reactive armour.
The T-90 is fitted with the Shtora-1 defensive aids suite which is produced by Electronintorg of Russia. This system includes infrared jammer, laser warning system with four laser warning receivers, grenade discharging system which produces an aerosol screen and a computerised control system.
It is also fitted with NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) protection equipment.
Fire control and observation
"The T-90S has the 1A4GT integrated fire control system (IFCS) which is automatic but with manual override."
The T-90S has the 1A4GT integrated fire control system (IFCS) which is automatic but with manual override for the commander. The IFCS contains the gunner's 1A43 day fire control system, gunner's TO1-KO1 thermal imaging sight which has a target identification range of 1.2km to 1.5km and commander's PNK-S sight.
The gunner's 1A43 day FCS comprises: 1G46 day sight / rangefinder with missile guidance channel, 2E42-4 armament stabiliser, 1V528 ballistic computer and DVE-BS wind gauge.
The commander's PNK-4S sight includes a TKN-4S (Agat-S) day / night sight which has identification ranges of 800m (day) and 700m (night).
The driver is equipped with a TVN-5 infrared night viewer.
Propulsion
The T-90S has a liquid-cooled V-84MS 618kW (840 hp) four-stroke V-12 piston engine. This engine can be fuelled by T-2 or TS-1 kerosene and A-72 benzine, in addition to diesel. The tank can carry up to 1,600 litres of fuel in the main fuel tanks and fuel drums. The fuel tanks are reinforced with armour plating.
The tank is provided with a snorkel for deep fording and can ford 5m of water with equipment which can be deployed in 20 minutes.
The mechanical transmission includes primary reduction gear, two planetary final gearboxes and two planetary final drives. The running gear features torsion bar suspension with hydraulic shock absorbers at one, two and six road wheel stations and tracks with rubber-metallic pin hinges.

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T-90S during demonstrations.
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The T-90S main armament is a 125mm 2A46M smoothbore gun.
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The T-90S a derivative of the T-72.
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The constituent parts of the 9M119M laser-guided missile of the Refleks guided weapon system.
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T-90S on exercise.
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T-90S on mobility demonstrations.
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The turret of the T-90S showing Shtora-1 countermeasures system.
________________________________________

Modern Equipment
[edit] Handguns
• FN Browning GP35 9mmx19 mm
• SAF (Small Arms Factory) Pistol 1A 9mmx19 mm, This is more or less a copy of the Canadian Inglis 9 mm
• Glock 17 9mmx19 mm, The Glock 19 along with the 17 is in use with the Special Protection Group (Prime Minister's Security)
[edit] Sub-machine guns and carbines
• Heckler & Koch MP5A3 9mmx19 mm SMG
• Heckler & Koch MP5K 9mmx19 mm SMG
• SAF Carbine 1A 9mmx19 mm, Indian made Sterling L2A1 SMG
• SAF Carbine 2A1 9mmx19 mm, Silenced Carbine
• UZI 9mmx19 mm SMG
[edit] Assault rifles


Soldier training with the INSAS rifle, the standard issue infantry weapon of the Indian Army

• AK-7, clone of the AK-47
• INSAS 5.56mmx45 mm Assault Rifle
• Zittara Indian version of the IMI Tavor TAR-21 Israeli Micro-Tavor
• TAVOR TAR-21 5.56mmx45 mm, for special forces currently 3070 have been purchased from Israel [1]
• IMI Galil
• AK-101
• AK-103
• AK47M1 7.62mmx39 mm, all black Bulgarian AK. Most of these have been imported for police and paramilitary forces
• East German MPi-KM MPi-KMS72 7.62mmx39 mm (Second hand)
• Czech Vz.58 and Vz.58P 7.62mmx39 mm
• Colt M16A2 rifle for special forces
• T91 assault rifle for special forces
• M4 for special forces
[edit] Grenades
• Multi Mode Grenade Shivalik
[edit] Sniper rifles
• Dragunov SVD59 7.62mmx54mmR Sniper Rifle
• Mauser SP66 7.62mmx51 mm Sniper Rifle
• Heckler & Koch MSG-90 7.62mmx51 mm Sniping Rifle. The H&K PSG-1 sniping rifle serves with the NSG anti-terrorist units while small numbers of the Steyr Mannlicher SSG69 serve with the para-military Border Security Force(BSF)
[edit] Machine guns
• MG 1B 7.62mmx51 mm, Indian made Bren- This is currently being retired. But may remain a while longer because of teething problems with its successor, the INSAS LMG
• MG 2A1 7.62mmx51 mm, Indian made MAG 58
• MG 5A 7.62mmx51 mm This is the Indian manufactured Co-axial MAG 58
• MG 6A 7.62mmx51 mm Another Indian version of the MAG58 specifically designed as a tank commanders gun.
• INSAS 5.56mmx45 mm LMG
• FN-Browning M1919 .30Cal, in very limited quantities
• Browning M2 machine gun .50cal, heavy machine gun in very limited numbers
• M60 7.62mm LMG
• IMI Negev 5.56mm LMG
[edit] Projectile launchers
• Milkor MGL under licenced production
• AGS-17 Plamya 30 mm automatic grenade launcher
• M40 RCL 106 mm
• Carl Gustav 84 mm recoilless rifles
• NTW-20 20 mm Rifle
• Vidhwansak Anti-Material Rifle [2]
[edit] Anti-Tank Guided Missiles


Nag missile and the Nag missile carrier (NAMICA).
• Nag- Third Generation fire and forget IIR Guided ATGM developed Indigenously. Its undergoing user trials. 443 missiles ordered.
• Milan 2- License Produced
• 9M113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
• 9M111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
• 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)- Being Phased out
• 9M119 Svir (AT-11 Sniper)- for T-90S.
• Lahat- fired from Arjun MBT 120mm Cannon.
[edit] Remotely Operated Vehicles
Daksh IED handling robot [3]
[edit] Armoured vehicles


Arjun MBT.


A T-90 Bhishma tank on display.
[edit] Main Battle Tanks
• Arjun MBT Mk1 - main battle tanks (94+). The Army has ordered production of this tank and the first batch of 53 of the ordered 124 tanks has already rolled out of the Avadi factory and are currently being put through trials to check the quality control of the production process. The remaining tanks will follow thereafter. Indian Army had bought 12 of these tanks for testing.First batch of tank is delivered.Indian army rejected tank due to insufficient for army requirements.
• T-90S Bhishma - main battle tanks (610). Over 1000(including Russian made 350 T-90) more T-90S will be manufactured in India by 2020. India signed a new contract for 350 additional T-90 tanks from Russia, total of 1600+ within 2020.Indian T-90S tanks are not equipped with the Shtora-1 countermeasures suite. [4] [5].
• T-72 M1 AAmirtanks (2,480+). 968 T72M1 are upgraded by the Heavy vehicles factory (HVF). While requests for proposal for upgrading approximately 1000 other T-72's have been sent to various firms in Israel, Russia, Poland and France.
• T-55 (900): Some of the T-55 tanks will be attached to infantry brigades and battalions, as Tarmour AFV since despite their vintage, the 105 mm L7 gun has substantial firepower.[4]
• Vijayanta -(1800) Reserve
• PT-76 - 500 in service
[edit] Armoured fighting vehicles
• BMP-1 (700) and BMP-2 (1500+)Sarath -(AFV) mechanised infantry combat vehicles relegated the OT-62/64 to mortar carriers. The BMP-2 are now being modernized with TISAS (thermal imaging stand alone sights), better fire control, and more modern ATGM armament (Konkurs M). BMP-1 has been phased out and the upgraded BMP-2 is BMP-2 M with two thermobaric missiles and two tandem warhead Konkurs missiles. Its also has an integrated TI sight and an LRF. Has an AGL mounted on the turret which is also stablised in the horizontal plane.
• Casspir Mine Resistant Armoured Vehicles
• WZT-3 (200 out of order of 352 so far) Armored Recovery Vehicles from Poland
• BTR-80 APC
• SKOT APC
• BRDM-2 (255) amphibious reconnaissance vehicles. Armed with anti-tank missiles.
• FV432 APC
• Mahindra Axe Light support vehicle
• Swaraj Mazda armoured trucks
• FV101 Scorpion ARV
• BMD-3 IFV
[edit] Artillery
• Under Field Artillery Rationalization Plan, Indian Army plans to procure 3000 to 4000 155 mm Towed, Wheeled and Tracked Artillery Systems. [6][7]
[edit] Towed artillery
• 155 mm Bofors Haubits FH77/A
• 155mm Soltam M68
• M-46 130 mm field guns replacing the 105 mm IFG Mk1/2/3
• 122 mm D-30 towed howitzers (To be phased out)
• 105 mm Light Field Gun (To be phased out)
• 105 mm Indian Field Gun (To be phased out)
• Metamorphosis 155 mm GUN by upgrading present M46 130 mm with a maximum range of 39 k.m.
• 130 mm towed field gun M1954 (M-46)
[edit] Self propelled artillery
• FV433 Abbot SPG (105 mm) and M-46 Catapult (130 mm) to be replaced by 3600 new 155 mm self-propelled howitzers by 2025. On the short list is the Denel LIW T6 turreted Arjun and the Celsius (Bofors) FH-77AD[6][7] The Polish licensed version of the AS-90 self-propelled artillery is also considered.
• Bhim-Initial reports that the Arjun hull might be used with a 155 mm self-propelled howitzer by fitting the South African T6 turret which has the G5 howitzer fitted, proved to be misfounded. The SPH would be integrated at Bharat Earth Movers Ltd, which would manufacture additional Arjun chassis & hulls for the purpose. At present, the Bhim SPH program is in limbo, since Denel has been temporarily blacklisted by the Indian Ministry of Defence, while corruption charges are being investigated.
• 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm SPGH
• KRAB 155mm SPGH
[edit] Multiple rocket launchers
• Smerch 9K58 MBRL (38) - 300 mm multiple rocket launch system. Further order for 24 units will be completed by 2010.[8]
• Pinaka MBRL (80)- 214 mm multiple rocket launch system replacing the 122 mm BM-21. 80 launchers to be inducted by 2009.[9]
• BM-21 (150+) - Modernized rockets with range of 40 km was purchased from Russia. To be replaced by Pinaka.

[edit] Air defence
Surface to air missile Systems
• Akash- Under Trials. Due to delays in the Akash missile program the ZRK-SD Kvadrat / SA-6a Gainful air defence systems are being upgraded.
• SA-6 Gainful- The Indian Army has sought to upgrade its SA-6 Kvadrat and SA-8 Missile systems whilst the Akash gets ready. The Indian magazine "Strategic Affairs " (No. 0011/ Issue: December 16) noted: "Poland has won an order worth $200 m from India to upgrade 100 Kvadrat (SA6) and 50 OSA-AKM (SA8) mobile surface to air missiles. The contract made public in August, is to be completed by 2002. The upgrades include integration of new radars, communications and control systems, improvements to the launch vehicle including new power packs. The Kvadrat upgrade includes new electronics for better electronic counter measures, passive infra-red search and track sensors."
• SA-10 [10]
• Trishul- Under Trials. Due to delays in the Trishul missile program the OSA-AKM / SA-8b Gecko air defence systems are being upgraded. Cancelled due to cost of production. [11]
• SA-8 Gecko- In Service
• SA-13 Gopher- In Service
MANPADS
• SA-16 Gimlet- In Service
• SA-7 Grail- In Service, to be phased out
Air Defense Artillery
• Tunguska M1 (108) - low level air defense system [12]
• ZSU-23-4M 'Shilka' self-propelled air defence guns- 100 Systems upgraded
• Upgraded Bofors L40/70 40 mm AA guns replacing the L40/60
• ZSU-23-2 twin 23 mm AA guns - Total 800 purchased
[edit] Surface to surface missiles
• BrahMos Land Attack Cruise Missile-[13][14]
• Prithvi-I Short Range Ballistic Missile (500km) - In Service
• Agni-I Medium Range Ballistic Missile (700km)- In Service
• Agni-II Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (2500km)- In Service
• Agni-III Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (3500km)- In Service
[edit] Non-combat vehicles
[edit] Engineering Vehicles
• Bridge Layer Tank using a T-72 chassis and Kartik Armoured Bridgelayer on a Vijayanta chassis - armoured vehicle-launched bridges
• Multi-Hop and Extended Span Assault Bridges on T-72 chassis
• Sarvatra - 8x8 truck-mounted bridging system
• VT-72B ARV (200+) and WZT-3 ARV (124, 228 to be delivered by 2007) - armoured recovery vehicle replacing the Vijayanta ARV
• BMP-2 Armoured Amphibious Dozer and Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle (ERV)
[edit] Mine protected vehicles
• Casspir - mine protected vehicles
[edit] Logistic vehicles
• Stallion 4x4 Truck for GS Role
• Ashok Leyland Truck Fire Fighting
• Ashok Leyland 5kl Water Bowser
• Ashok Leyland Light Recovery Vehicle 4x4
• Mahindra - light multi-role 4x4
• Rampar - amphibious 4x4
[edit] Aircraft
This is a list of aircraft of the Indian Army. For the list of aircraft of the Indian Air Force, see List of aircraft of the Indian Air Force.
Aircraft Origin Type Versions In service[15]
Notes
HAL Dhruv
India
utility helicopter ~115 To acquire 120+ more Dhruv in next 5 years.
Aérospatiale Alouette III
India
utility helicopter SA 316B Chetak 60 built by HAL
Aérospatiale Lama
India
utility helicopter SA 315B Cheetah 120 built by HAL
Mil Mi-25
Soviet Union
Attack helicopter Mil Mi-25 Hind-F 12
Mil Mi-35
Soviet Union
Attack helicopter Mil Mi-35 Hind 32
IAI Searcher II
Israel
reconnaissance UAV 100+
IAI Heron
Israel
reconnaissance UAV 50+
DRDO Nishant
India
reconnaissance UAV 12 Delivery of 12 UAV's in 2007.
[edit] Future Procurements
Light Utility Helicopter: The Indian army has projected a requirement for up to 197 light helicopters to replace its aging fleet of Chetaks and Cheetahs. The Indian Army chose the Eurocopter AS 550 under a US$550 million contract in summer of 2007. Under this contract 60 helicopters were to be supplied from Eurocopter in fly-away condition and the rest were to be assembled by HAL in India. This order was later scrapped due to allegations of unfair field trials from competing company Bell Helicopters. [16] [17]
Five global helicopter majors are in the fray to sell India 197 multi-role, light helicopters, in a deal worth Rs. 3,000 crore. Eurocopter AS550 Fennec; Bell Helicopters Bell 407; Kamov Ka-226, Agusta A109 Power or A119 Koala and McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems (MD 520N) have been given time till 19 December 2008 to submit proposals.
Weighing less than three tonnes when armed, these multi-role, light turbine helicopters will replace the 1970s vintage Chetak and Cheetah helicopters operated by the Army Aviation Corps and the Air Force. They will undertake tasks such as reconnaissance and observation, casualty evacuation, electronic warfare, escort duties, anti-insurgency operations and ferrying personnel to and from the battlefield.
Of the 197 helicopters, which are to be bought in a fly away condition and via knock down kits, 133 are for the Army, while 64 will be delivered to the Air Force. The helicopter deal is part of a mega modernisation programme which will see the Army eventually receiving 197 helicopters and the Indian Air Force getting 188. The deal also includes an offset clause, under which the successful vendor must source defence-related goods and services to the value of 50 per cent of the deal from Indian companies.
The process — including discussions on offset proposals, technical evaluation, short-listing by the Defence Ministry, hot weather and winter trails — is expected to be completed by the middle of 2010.[18]
India’s main battle tanks had one been relatively advanced by world standards, but long delays in fielding the indigenous “Arjun” MBT, combined with a successful Pakistani/Ukrainian program for its T-80UD “Al-Khalid” tanks, eroded India’s local advantage. The poor performance of T-72s in combat against modern main battle tanks could not have been comforting, either. In early October 2006, India Defence and Indian papers reported that the Indian Army intended to produce nearly 1,000 T90S ‘Bhishma’ main battle tanks in India by 2020. These would be bought in addition to the 310 T90 MBTs already under contract from Russia. Later that month, news reports noted a follow-on contract for another 330 T-90S tank kits from Russia that would assembled in India. Taken together those 2 firm production agreements reportedly exceed $1 billion.
The modernized T-72 now known as the T-90 has reportedly encountered serious problems in Indian service, from issues with its Thales thermal imaging systems, to difficulties in hot weather, to low readiness rates. Meanwhile, negotiations with Russia over technology transfer issues had shelved the 1,000 tank indigenous production goal, leaving only the 2 firm production agreements. The Arjun project has continued to fade, however, with the Indian Army announcing in July 2008 that production would be capped at just 124 tanks. As the final act in the battle for the core of India’s future tank force, recent reports indicate that the Russians have removed their technology transfer roadblocks, clearing the way for fully indigenous T-90S production in India…
• The T-90 in India: Directions and Delays
• Updates and Key Events
The T-90 in India: Directions and Delays

Arjun tank
(click to view full)
As of December 2006, the 310 T-90S tanks imported from Russia under a February 2001 Rs 3,625 crore (about $795 million) contract are divided between the first lot of 124 T-90S tanks bought off-the-shelf, and 186 imported in knocked-down condition for assembly at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi.
The goal was to begin progressive manufacture of the follow-on batch of 1,000 from 2007-2008 onward, working under the license production agreement associated with India’s 2001 order. The idea was to build upon and broaden India’s indigenous capabilities as the process moved forward.
The purchase of 330 more ready-for-assembly T-90 kits later in October 2006 would appear to be a deviation from this strategy, but as of August 2008, production of the fully localized Indian tanks has not even begun yet at the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory. Jane’s believed that the order for the 330 sets of T-90S components was driven by chronic delays in the production schedule of the domestic Arjun MBT, and multi-year delays in T-72 modernization due to bureaucratic vacillation. This turned out to be partly correct; as DID has reported before, those are chronic problems in India’s defense market. It seems that there was also a problem with full Russian technology transfer, however, which held up production at Avadi.

T-80UD “Al-Khalid”
(click to view full)
Confirmation of the T-90’s status as India’s future tank has also faced operational difficulties, including the in-service difficulties noted by an October 2007 MosNews’ report. These include repeated heat-related malfunctions of the fire-control system’s key Thales Catherine thermal imaging (TI) camera, lack of cooling systems leading to uninhabitable temperatures over 60C degrees (over 140F) inside the tank, and reports that at least one armored regiment had an in-service rate of just 25% for its T-90s.
The T-72s’ “Project Rhino” may eventually get started as well under the Army’s 2020 plans, adding reactive armor, electronics, sights, et. al. in collaboration with Israel, Poland and Russia. Persistent reports that many Indian T-72s lack effective IR-imagine equipment would appear to make such upgrades a priority item, but as Bharat-Rakshak notes, progress has been very slow.
Updates and Key Events

T-90, firing
(click to view full)
Aug 20/08: At the 8th meeting of the Indo-Russian working group on shipbuilding, aviation and land systems, Russia agreed to full product support for indigenous production of T-90S tanks, including the urgent requirement of specification of T-90 gun barrels Those specifications will reportedly be delivered by December 2008, clearing the way for full T-90S production in India.
The meeting also finalized indigenization requirements for the Russian AT-14 Konkur missile systems and a computerised advanced information system for India’s new range of P-17 warships, while discussing more contentious issues like the Gorshkov carrier contract and the FGFA “5th generation fighter aircraft” joint project. Yahoo! India | Outlook India | Zee News.
July 7/08: India’s army decides to cap production of the Arjun tank at just 124 vehicles. T-90 tanks will be the mainstay of India’s future tank force instead at 1,657 vehicles planned, despite ongoing issues with operations in hot weather. This overall plan changes the force structure proposed in 2006, from 3,780 tanks (1,302 T-90s and 2,480 T-72s) to 2,473 higher-end tanks (1,657 T-90 Bhishma, 124 Arjun tanks, and 692 upgraded T-72M1 Ajeya)
Read “India Plans to Cap Arjun Tank Production” for more.
Aug 29/07: India’s MoD issues a press release:
“Heavy Vehicles Factory has so far supplied 181 T-90 tanks to Army. No technical problems viz barrel bursting has been observed in T90 tanks. The problem of barrel bursting was noticed earlier in T-72 tank. The bursting of barrel in T-72 tanks occurred in barrels of Russian origin as well as of Indian origin. The problem was analysed in consultation with Russian experts and remedial action towards modifying the chemistry of material has been taken. This information was given by the Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh in a written reply to Shri A Krishna Swamy and Shri Kuldeep Bishnoi in Lok Sabha today.”
May 16/07: Frontier India reports that India’s T-90S tanks continue to have problems with their torsion bar suspensions.
Note that the swastika was used in India for many centuries before the Germans ever got hold of it; it has a rather different meaning (“sun”) there.
Oct 27/06: A MosNews article “India Buys 330 Russian Tanks” reports that India is buying another 330 T-90s in kit condition, for final assembly in India. It adds that deliveries of the initial 124 T-90S tanks under the previous 310 vehicle order:
”...began in December 2002 and were completed within 12-14 months, while another 180 MBTs have since been assembled at Avadi and the first part of the order is nearing completion. The T-90S tanks have been inducted into six armored regiments in northern and central India.”
Oct 4/06: India Defence:
”...the Indian Army is to acquire nearly 1000 locally produced T90S Bhishma MBT’s by the year 2020, in addition to the 310 T90 MBT’s procured from Russia.
The Times of India Reports: The Army gameplan is to have 21 regiments of T-90S ‘Bhishma’ tanks and 40 regiments of upgraded T-72 M1 ‘Ajeya’ tanks by 2020 since the “speed and shock effect” of mechanised forces will continue to play a decisive role in future wars, say sources.
An armoured regiment typically has 45 tanks, along with another 17 for training purposes, war reserves and replacements. So, the 1.13-million Army intends to face future armoured battles with a mix of around 3,800 T-90S and T-72 tanks.”
Additional Readings & Sources
• The Armor Site – T90S main battle tank. In India, they are known as “Bhishma.”
• Bharat Rakshak – T-72M1 Main Battle Tank, aka. “Ajeya”
• Bharat Rakshak – Arjun MK.I Main Battle Tank
• Wikipedia – Arjun MBT. Pretty good article.
• Global Security – T-80UD (Pakistan’s “Al-Khalid” tank)
• Business Standard (Apr 22/08) – Ajai Shukla: Friendly fire damages the Arjun “Operating military equipment is fraught with danger and upgrading is a continuous process. But the army’s tolerance for Russian defects contrasts starkly with its impatience for the Arjun.”
• Rediff (April 19/08) – India’s battle tank of future & love for Russia. The article claims that India’s Army prefers the Russian tanks, and is being less than honest in reporting problems with the Arjun, while avoiding the head-to-head trials it has promised.
• NDTV (Dec 21/06) – Army plans for T-90s in jeopardy. ”...problems in setting up the assembly line at the Heavy Tank Factory Avadi in Tamil Nadu are crippling modernisation plans.” This may also help to explain the additional Russian orders….
• DID (Nov 17/06) – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business. Contains a very extensive set of links to articles covering India’s defense sector and its organizational/ program issues.
• The Indian Express (Nov 14/06) – Arjun, Main Battle Tanked. The paper is less than enthusiastic about the tank’s chances and the program’s readiness, despite existing contracts for 124 machines.
• MosNews (Oct 27/06) – India Buys 330 Russian Tanks
• The Hindu (Oct 12/06) – Full scale production of Arjun to begin soon: Rao
• StaretgyPage (May 30/06) – Arjun, the Big Tank That Couldn’t
• Defence Journal (September 2001) – India’s indigenous tank production – a stalled effort. By Lt Gen (Retd) Srdar FS Lodi

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EXTREME BODY BUILDERS

INTERPOL

INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization, with 187 member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime.
INTERPOL aims to facilitate international police co-operation even where diplomatic relations do not exist between particular countries. Action is taken within the limits of existing laws in different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. INTERPOL’s constitution prohibits ‘any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.’
INTERPOL’s Leadership
The President of INTERPOL and the Secretary General work closely together in providing strong leadership and direction to the Organization.
Interpol acronym for the International Criminal Police Organization, a worldwide clearinghouse for police information. Conceived in 1914, Interpol was formally established in 1923 with headquarters at Vienna. In 1938, it was effectively disbanded by Hitler's Anschluss of Austria. After World War II, the agency was reconstituted (1946) with headquarters in Paris. Its principal services are to provide its 184 member nations with information on the whereabouts of international criminals, to organize seminars on scientific crime detection, and to facilitate the apprehension of criminals, although it does not apprehend criminals directly. The organization claims to avoid those crimes that deal with political, military, religious, or racial matters. Interpol has been most successful with regard to counterfeiting, forgery, smuggling, and the narcotics trade.

Interpol has actively been involved for a number of years in combating Information Technology Crime. Rather than ‘re-inventing the wheel’, the Interpol General Secretariat has harnessed the expertise of its members in the field of Information Technology Crime (ITC) through the vehicle of a ‘working party’ or a group of experts. In this instance, the working party consists of the heads or experienced members of national computer crime units. These working parties have been designed to reflect regional expertise and exist in Europe, Asia, America and in Africa. All working parties are in different stages of development. It should be noted that the work done by the working parties is not Interpol’s only contribution to combating ITC, but it certainly represents the most noteworthy contribution to date.

KGB

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
The basic organizational structure of the KGB was created in 1954, when the reorganization of the police apparatus was carried out. In the late 1980s, the KGB remained a highly centralized institution, with controls implemented by the Politburo through the KGB headquarters in Moscow.
Structure
The KGB was originally designated as a "state committee attached to the Council of Ministers." On July 5, 1978, a new law on the Council of Ministers changed the status of the KGB, along with that of several other state committees, so that its chairman was a member of the Council of Ministers by law. According to the 1977 Soviet Constitution, the Council of Ministers "coordinates and directs" the work of the ministries and state committees, including the KGB. In practice, however, the KGB had more autonomy than most other government bodies and operated with a large degree of independence from the Council of Ministers. The situation was similar with the Supreme Soviet, which had formal authority over the Council of Ministers and its agencies. In 1989 the actual powers of the Supreme Soviet, however, gave it little if any power over KGB operations.
The KGB was a union-republic state committee, controlling corresponding state committees of the same name in the fourteen non-Russian republics. (All-union ministries and state committees, by contrast, did not have corresponding branches in the republics but executed their functions directly through Moscow.) Below the republic level, there existed KGB administrations (upravleniia) in the kraia (see Glossary) and oblasts (see Glossary). In the Russian Republic, however, there was no separate KGB. Oblast KGB administrations in the Russian Republic were subordinated directly to the central KGB offices in Moscow. At the lower levels, autonomous okruga (see Glossary), cities, and raiony (see Glossary) had KGB departments or sections.
The KGB also had a broad network of special departments in all major government institutions, enterprises, and factories. They generally consisted of one or more KGB representatives, whose purpose was to ensure the observance of security regulations and to monitor political sentiments among employees. The special departments recruited informers to help them in their tasks. A separate and very extensive network of special departments existed within the armed forces and defense-related institutions.
Although a union-republic agency, the KGB was highly centralized and was controlled rigidly from the top. The KGB central staff kept a close watch over the operations of its branches, leaving the latter minimal autonomous authority over policy or cadre selection. Moreover, local government organs had little involvement in local KGB activities. Indeed, the high degree of centralization in the KGB was reflected in the fact that regional KGB branches were not subordinated to the local soviets (see Glossary), but only to the KGB hierarchy. Thus, they differed from local branches of most union-republic ministerial agencies, such as the MVD, which were subject to dual subordination.
The KGB was directed by a chairman--who was formally appointed by the Supreme Soviet but actually was selected by the Politburo-- one or two first deputy chairmen, and several (usually four to six) deputy chairmen. Key decisions were made by the KGB Collegium, which was a collective leadership body composed of the chairman, deputy chairmen, chiefs of certain KGB directorates, and one or two chairmen of republic KGB organizations.

CIA

About CIA
The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 47 w ith the signing of the National Security Act by President Harry S. Truman. The act also created a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to serve as head of the United States intelligence community; act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security; and serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amended the National Security Act to provide for a Director of National Intelligence who would assume some of the roles formerly fulfilled by the DCI, with a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Leon E. Panetta became Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on February 13, 2009.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency serves as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and reports to the Director of National Intelligence. The CIA director's responsibilities include:
• Collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that he shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions;
• Correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence;
• Providing overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the Intelligence Community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensuring that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection; and
• Performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct.
The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the responsibilities outlined above.
To accomplish its mission, the CIA engages in research, development, and deployment of high-leverage technology for intelligence purposes. As a separate agency, CIA serves as an independent source of analysis on topics of concern and also works closely with the other organizations in the Intelligence Community to ensure that the intelligence consumer—whether Washington policymaker or battlefield commander—receives the best intelligence possible.
As changing global realities have reordered the national security agenda, CIA has met these challenges by:
• Creating special, multidisciplinary centers to address such high-priority issues such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, international organized crime and narcotics trafficking, environment, and arms control intelligence.
• Forging stronger partnerships between the several intelligence collection disciplines and all-source analysis.
• Taking an active part in Intelligence Community analytical efforts and producing all-source analysis on the full range of topics that affect national security.
• Contributing to the effectiveness of the overall Intelligence Community by managing services of common concern in imagery analysis and open-source collection and participating in partnerships with other intelligence agencies in the areas of research and development and technical collection.
By emphasizing adaptability in its approach to intelligence collection, the CIA can tailor its support to key intelligence consumers and help them meet their needs as they face the issues of the post-Cold War World.
Strategic Intent 2007-2011

BSF

Border Security Forces
The Border Security Force (BSF) is responsible for guarding India's land borders during peacetime and prevent trans-border crimes. BSF has an extensive intelligence network to support these missions. The BSF was established on 01 December 1965, following Pakistani intrusions in the Rann of Kutch earlier that year. The total strength of the BSF is approsimately 180,000.
Nearly, one third of the BSF is deployed in Jammu & Kashmir. As part of its occupation of Kashmir, the Indian Government has deployed more than half a million soldiers and a quarter of a million paramilitary forces. Beginning in 1990 the Indian central government deployed the full range of paramilitary forces to Kashmir, as the Army was unwilling to commit its forces to the counter-insurgency operation. The BSF had never been committed tor this type of operation. The BSF transforme itself from a border force to a counter-insurgency formation, and established an intelligence network in the area. However, more units of the force were deployed without the required specialised equipment and training.
Allegations of human rights violations in Kashmir primarily implicate the BSF. The first three years of BSF search, cordon, detention and killings produced an increase in the incidence violence in the Valley. Overused personnel committed excesses, including unacknowledged detentions, "disappearances" and other human rights violations. Torture is practised to coerce detainees to reveal information about suspected militants or to confess to militant activity. It is also used to punish detainees who are believed to support or sympathize with militants. Security legislation authorizes the security forces to shoot to kill and to destroy civilian property, increasing the likelihood of abuses.
By the beginning of 1995, over 400,000 troops were reportedly deployed in Kashmir, including eight army divisions and other independent brigades across the state. At least fifty-six of 148 battalions of Border Security Forces - each including one thousand men - are engaged in Kashmir. Thirty-nine in the valley and seven in Doda District are involved in counter-insurgency operations, and ten along the line of control are involved in border security operations.
Security forces committed an estimated 100-200 extrajudicial killings of suspected militants in Jammu and Kashmir during 1997. Although well-documented evidence to corroborate cases and quantify trends is lacking, most observers believe that the number of killings attributed to regular Indian forces declined slightly from the previous year. According to press reports and anecdotal accounts, those killed typically had been detained by security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple bullet wounds and often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or were otherwise discovered the same day or a few days later.
Impunity has been and remains a serious problem in Jammu and Kashmir. Security forces have committed thousands of serious human rights violations over the course of the conflict, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Yet, during the period January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1997, only ten members of the security forces were tried and sentenced to 10 or more years imprisonment for violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab.
Civilian deaths caused by security forces in 1997 diminished for the fourth consecutive year in Jammu and Kashmir. This decrease apparently is due to press scrutiny and public criticism of abuses in previous years, increased training of military and paramilitary forces in humanitarian law, and greater sensitivity of commanders to rule of law issues. The security forces have not abandoned the abduction and extrajudicial execution of suspected militants, nor accepted accountability for these abuses. However, the inclination of many commanders to distance their units from such practices has led to reduced participation in them and a transfer of some of such actions to countermilitants.
Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by progovernment countermilitants, believed to operate under the direction of the Border Security Forces, continue as a significant pattern in Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants are former separatist militants who have surrendered to government forces but have retained their arms and paramilitary organization. Although precise numbers are unavailable, progovernment countermilitants may have committed 100 to 200 extrajudicial killings in Jammu and Kashmir during 1997. Human rights groups believed that the number was slightly lower than in 1996. Government agencies fund, exchange intelligence with, and direct operations of countermilitants as part of the counterinsurgency effort. Countermilitants are known to screen passersby at roadblocks and guard extensive areas of the Kashmir Valley from attacks by militants. In sponsoring and condoning countermilitant activity, which takes place outside the legal system, the Government cannot avoid responsibility for killings, abductions, and other abuses committed by these irregulars. Perhaps as many as 3,000 continue to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in the countryside, outside major towns. During 1997 the Government took steps to organize Kashmiri counter-militants as a battalion in the paramilitary forces as a means of bringing them under enhanced control and military discipline.
In Punjab the pattern of disappearances prevalent in the early 1990's appears to be at an end. Hundreds of police and security officials have not been held accountable for serious human rights abuses committed during the counterinsurgency of 1984-94. However, steps have been taken against a few such violators. The CBI actively is pursuing charges against dozens of police officials implicated in the "mass cremations" case. Police in the Tarn Taran district secretly disposed of bodies of suspected militants believed to have been abducted and extrajudicially executed, cremating them without the knowledge or consent of their families. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has reported that 984 unidentified bodies were cremated by Punjab police in Tarn Taran. Most reportedly were killed by Border Security Forces while trying to cross into India from Pakistan, were unidentified victims of accidents or suicide, or died in clashes between militant factions. However, 424 were apparently militants killed in the interior of the district, 291 of whom were subsequently identified. These numbers demonstrate the extent of the bloodshed during those years and, given the pattern of police abuses prevalent during the period, credibly include many killed in extrajudicial executions.
Under the auspices of the UN and with USG encouragement, counternarcotic officials of India and Pakistan have continued the cooperation begun in 1994. Indian and Pakistani officials met three times in 1995 and agreed to speedy exchange of information and contacts. Narcotics representatives also participate in the quarterly meetings between the Indian Border Security Force and the Pakistani Rangers. Few tangible results have yet come out of these meetings
At times of general elections to Lok Sabha and to the Legislative Assemblies, the State Governments generally seek assistance of the Central Government Offices and Departments located in the States for deployment of their employees in connection with the conduct of elections. The civil employees of Central para-military forces like the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force may also be required for such election duty.

CRPF

Central Reserve Police Force
The Central Reserve Police Force, established under the Central Reserve Police Force Act of 1949 (66 of 1949), includes some 165,000 personnel organized into 70 battalions, including seven rapid action battalions and two women battalions. The force is lightly armed and deployable throughout the country, serving as a back-up for the State Police should situations get out of control. Though initially created to respond to riots and civil disorder, orver time the Force has become involved in counter-insurgency operations for they have proven poorly prepared.
At times of general elections to Lok Sabha and to the Legislative Assemblies, the State Governments generally seek assistance of the Central Government Offices and Departments located in the States for deployment of their employees in connection with the conduct of elections. The civil employees of Central para-military forces like the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force may also be required for such election duty.

CISF

Central Industrial Security Force
The Home Ministry's Central Industrial Security Force, established under the Central Industrial Security Force Act of 1968 (50 of 1968), consists of some 90,000 personnel who guard public-sector areas. The Central Industrial Security Force is responsible for security services at ports and other transportation facilities, as well as various other facilities, such as the new mint situated at Cherlapally on the out skirts of Hyderabad.
The Central Industrial Security Force has been reported to have encountered problems with official corruption, as well as having been implicated in human rights abuses which harmed peasant communities in rural India. In 1996 the Madras Port Trust board approved a plan for disbanding the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) at the Madras port, and creating the port's own security force by either borrowing from the State police force or by recruiting directly or by other means. However the government has recently passed a law stating that all the government-run institutions, including Public Sector Undertakings [PSUs], are required to employ guards from Central Industrial Security Force.
At times of general elections to Lok Sabha and to the Legislative Assemblies, the State Governments generally seek assistance of the Central Government Offices and Departments located in the States for deployment of their employees in connection with the conduct of elections. The civil employees of Central para-military forces like the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force may also be required for such election duty.
S

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARDS

National Security Guards
Black Cat Commandos
The National Security Guards [NSG], established under the National Security Guard Act of 1986 (Act 47 of 1986), is India's premier counter-terrorist force. The NSG provides security to VIP's, conducts anti-sabotage checks, and is responsible for neutralizing terrorist threats to vital installations. Its missions include engaging terrorists in specific situations, responding to piracy in the air and on the land, and rescuing hostages in kidnap situations.
The NSG strength of around 7500 personnel is evenly divided between the Special Action Group (SAG) and the Special Rangers Group (SRG). The SAG is the offensive wing, with the members drawn from the Indian Army. The SRG, with members from central police organizations, supports the SAF in isolating target areas.
NSG was established following the 1984 Operational Bluestar that caused widespread damage in the Golden Temple complex. Shortcomings in that operational indicated the need for a special force for executing such operations with greater precision. The NSG has been deployed on only a few occasions, including Operation Black Thunder I & II in the Amritsar Golden Temple complex in 1988, and the Operation Ashwamedh storming of a hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft at Amritsar airport on 24 April 1994.
As part of its occupation of Kashmir, the Indian Government has deployed more than half a million soldiers and a quarter of a million paramilitary forces, including significant elements of the National Security Guards. While Indian forces have allegedly committed excesses, including torture, extrajudicial executions, disappearances, willful destruction of property and forced displacement in Kashmir, NSG personnel have not been prominently implicated in these activities.

RAW

Research and Analysis Wing [RAW]
The Research and Analysis Wing [RAW] is India's foreign intelligence agency. RAW has become an effective instrument of Indian national power, and has assumed a significant role in carrying out India's domestic and foreign policies. RAW has engaged in espionage against Pakistan and other neighboring countries. It has enjoyed the backing of successive Indian governments in these efforts. Working directly under the Prime Minister, the structure and operations of the Research & Analysis Wing are kept secret from Parliament.
Founded in 1968, RAW focused largely on Pakistan. Its formation was initially motivated by reports of Pakistan supplying weapons to Sikh militants, and providing shelter and training to guerrillas in Pakistan.
Numerous missions were assigned to RAW upon its creation. These included monitoring political and military developments in neighboring countries that affects Indian national security. Consequently, considerable attention is paid by RAW to Pakistan and China, countries that are traditional rivals of India.
RAW has evolved from its origins as a part of the Intelligence Bureau to develop into India's predominant intelligence organization. In 1968, RAW had 250 agents and a budget of Rs. 2 crore. This has expanded to a 2000 total of an estimated eight to ten thousand agents and a budget that experts place at Rs. 1500 crore, alternately estimated at $145 million.
Pakistan has accused the Research and Analysis Wing of sponsoring sabotage in Punjab, where RAW is alleged to have supported the Seraiki movement, providing financial support to promote its activities in Pakistan and organizing an International Seraiki Conference in Delhi in November-December 1993. RAW has an extensive network of agents and anti-government elements within Pakistan, including dissident elements from various sectarian and ethnic groups of Sindh and Punjab. Published reports in Pakistan allege that as many as 35,000 RAW agents entered Pakistan between 1983-93, with 12,000 working in Sindh, 10,000 in Punjab, 8,000 in North West Frontier Province and 5000 in Balochistan.
RAW has a long history of activity in Bangladesh, supporting both secular forces and the area's Hindu minority. The involvement of RAW in East Pakistan is said to date from the 1960s, when RAW supported Mujibur Rahman, leading up to his general election victory in 1970. RAW also provided training and arms to the Bangladeshi freedom fighters known as Mukti Bahini. RAW's aid was instrumental in Bangladesh's gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971.
During the course of its investigation the Jain Commission received testimony on the official Indian support to the various Sri Lankan Tamil armed groups in Tamil Nadu. From 1981, RAW and the Intelligence Bureau established a network of as many as 30 training bases for these groups in India. Centers were also established at the high-security military installation of Chakrata, near Dehra Dun, and in the Ramakrishna Puram area of New Delhi. This clandestine support to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), some of whom were on the payroll of RAW, was later suspended. Starting in late 1986 the Research and Analysis Wing focused surveillance on the LTTE which was expanding ties with Tamil Nadu separatist groups. Rajiv Gandhi sought to establish good relations with the LTTE, even after the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] experience in Sri Lanka. But the Indian intelligence community failed to accurately assess the character of the LTTE and its orientation India and its political leaders. The LTTE assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was apparently motivated by fears of a possible re-induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka and a crackdown on the LTTE network in Tamil Nadu.
RAW was heavily criticized in 1999, following the Pakistani incursions at Kargil. Critics accused RAW of failing to provide intelligence that could have prevented the ensuing ten-week conflict that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of full-scale war. While the army has been critical of the lack of information they received, RAW has pointed the finger at the politicians, claiming they had provided all the necessary information. Most Indian officials believe that in order to prevent another such occurrence, communication needs to be increased between the intelligence agencies, which would require structural reform.
Most recently, RAW has gained attention for providing the US with intelligence on Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets for the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Maps and photographs of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with other evidence implicating Osama bin Laden in terrorist attacks, were given to US intelligence officials.
* * *
The objectives of RAW include:
To monitor the political and military developments in adjoining countries, which have direct bearing on India's national security and in the formulation of its foreign policy.
To seek the control and limitation of the supply of military hardware to Pakistan, mostly from European countries, the USA and China.
The chief of the RAW is designated Secretary (Research) in the Cabinet Secretariat, which is part of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Most of the position's occupants have been experts on either Pakistan or China. The head of the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), the external intelligence agency, enjoys greater autonomy of functioning than their counterparts in the UK and US and has the same privileged direct access to the Prime Minister as their UK counterparts. The control of the Cabinet Secretary over the RAW is limited to administrative and financial matters, with very little say in operational and policy matters.
They also have the benefit of training in either US or the UK, and more recently in Israel. The Secretary (R) reports on an administrative basis to the Cabinet Secretary, who reports to the Prime Minister (PM). However, on a daily basis the Secretary (R) reports to the National Security Advisor. Reporting to the Secretary (R) are: Two Special Secretaries and one Special Director of the ARC, the Aviation Research Centre; Four Additional Secretaries, responsible for different geographical regions; A large number (above 40) Joint Secretaries, who are the functional heads of various desks.
The structure of the RAW is a matter of speculation, but brief overviews of the same are present in the public domain. Attached to the HQ of RAW at Lodhi Road, New Delhi are different regional headquarters, which have direct links to overseas stations and are headed by a controlling officer who keeps records of different projects assigned to field officers who are posted abroad. Intelligence is usually collected from a variety of sources by field officers and deputy field officers; it is either pre-processed (vetted) by a senior field officer or by a desk officer. The desk officer then passes the information to the Joint Secretary and then on to the Additional Secretary and from there it is disseminated to the concerned end user. The Director RAW is a member of the JIC Steering Committee and is authorized to brief the Prime Minister should the need arise.
Some officers of the RAW are members of a specialized service, the Research and Analysis Service (RAS), but several officers also serve on deputation from other services. The RAW has sub-organizations like the Aviation Research Center (ARC), the Radio Research Center (RRC) or the Electronics and Technical Service (ETS), which have considerable capacity for technical intelligence gathering. Another important branch under the operational control of the RAW is the Directorate General of Security (DGS). This agency has oversight over organizations like the Special Frontier Force (SFF), the Special Services Bureau (SSB) etc... Liaison with the military is maintained through the Military Intelligence Advisory Group and the Military Advisor to the Director RAW.
Though the RAW is primarily intended for collecting intelligence beyond India's national borders, it has over time come to have a strong presence in all fields of intelligence gathering. The RAW was brought into internal security issues during the Sikkim situation, it played a role in the events of the emergency of 1977-79, it was asked to operate in Punjab to counter-balance the presence of the ISI (and so also in Kashmir), and the RAW has provided the security for the India's nuclear program. Right from its formation in 18 September, 1968, R N Kao, the founding father of RAW, picked up the best men from within government and from outside for RAW. A combination of military, academicians, bureaucrats and policemen was a fine start for RAW which modelled itself on the lines of CIA

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

Intelligence Bureau (IB)
The Central Intelligence Bureau (IB) is reputed to be the oldest intelligence agency in the world. In the past it was tasked with all intelligence targeting but in recent times it has focused on internal security. The IB is officially under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), but in practice the Director IB (DIB) is a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and Steering Committee and has the authority to brief the Prime Minister should the need arise, but intelligence inputs (at least in theory) go through the regular channels in the MHA to the JIC.
The collection mechanisms of the IB vary depending on the region, but the IB operates both at the state level and the national level. The bulk of the intelligence collection is carried out by `Grade II' employees of the IB, i.e. in increasing order of seniority; the Security Assistants (Constable), the Junior Intelligence Officers (Head Constable), the Asst. (Central) Intelligence Officer (Sub-Inspector), Deputy Central Intelligence Officers (Inspector), and Joint Central Intelligence Officers (Superintendent of Police). The `Class I'(gazette) officers carry out coordination and higher-level management the IB. These officers are (again in increasing order of seniority) Asst. Director, the Deputy Director, Joint Director, Addl. Director, Special Director or Special Secretary and finally the Director IB. Grade II officers are in part direct recruitment and officer deputed from state police forces, but Class I officers are mostly deputed from state services.
At the state level all IB officers are part of the State Special Bureau report to a Central Intelligence Officer (the intelligence advisor to the Governor). The IB maintains a large number of field units and headquarters (which are under the control of Joint or Deputy Directors). It is through these offices and the intricate process of deputation that a very `organic' linkage between the state police agencies and the IB is maintained. In addition to these at the national level the IB has several units (in some cases Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaus) to keep track of issues like terrorism, counter-intelligence, VIP security and threat assessment, and sensitive areas (i.e. J&K, North East Region (NER) etc...).
Some of the problems within the IB are briefly listed below:
1) There are problems regarding recruiting: in the past postings and deputations with the IB were regarded as positive career choices among police officers, and this led to a favorable buildup of expertise in the both state and national law enforcement circles. In more recent times, this has changed, state police forces offer far swifter means of promotion and career advancement, also the perks of state level police postings in some cases compare more favorably than those of a central posting. The result is that people have to be forcibly deputed to the IB. This is further compounded by the fact that IB postings often involve extremely hazardous duties in hostile populations. Thus some postings go unfilled and in some cases the IB gets very thinly stretched on the ground. This leads to gaps in intelligence collection.
2) In sensitive areas (ex. J&K. NER) the pace of security operations is very high. This means that the turnaround time between collection, collation and dissemination has to be very small. IB officers serve largely in advisory capacity and have to coordinate with the regular enforcement arms. To reduce the dead time in intelligence handling, today in most sensitive areas, the law enforcement arms (in most cases) are endowed with their own intelligence units. These units do varying amounts of intelligence targeting and are in theory supposed to coordinate with the IB, sometimes however, this coordination is not achieved and quite possibly another intelligence agency dominates leading to the loss of the `overall picture'.
3) The IB is Government of India's principal internal news agency. It is responsible for monitoring all aspects of governance. As an extension of this role, it routinely monitors the state governments and often draws up independent assessments of the security situation in a state and advises the Governor. At the central level the IB closely monitors developments relating to parliamentary affairs and reports back to the Cabinet Secretariat. The Special Enquiry and Surveillance unit (SES) of the IB handles most of this work. This task is vital in maintaining the stability of elected governments. However it can easily be subverted to achieve less savory aims, especially at the state level. Apart from any actual degradation in capacity, this kind of work breeds the impression in that the IB is purely a mechanism for targeting the opposition.
4) The IB is also tasked with Counter-Intelligence operations. This area of IB work has been the object of severe criticism and almost every internal disturbance is projected as a failure in counter-intelligence (there is always talk of the absence of specificity in threat assessments). Problems related to this part are discussed more extensively in the section on counter-intelligence issues.
The task forces have in all probability made several recommendations about these topics. The task force on Internal Security has stated the need to place emphasis on the position of the Secretary (MHA) and that all intelligence regarding internal security developments should be passed to him; this is appears to be an attempt to foster the functioning of the `Core Intelligence Processing Unit' in the MHA. The task force on Internal Security has also made clear the need to create dedicated `systems and procedures' of intelligence dissemination to aid in the conduct of counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations. It is also likely that the capabilities in the IB relating to counter-intelligence are being upgraded (this is discussed in greater detail in the section on Counter-Intelligence). The task force on internal security has also called for an end to political interference in the IB, it has suggested that a internal review and oversight body be set up in the IB to stamp out this sort of thing, but it is unclear to the author as to exactly how this mechanism will function.

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RIVERS

Length of some important rivers (in kms):
NAME : LENGTH

1) Indus 2,900

2) Brahmaputra 2,900

3) Ganga 2,510

4) Godavari 1,450

5) Narmada 1,290

6) Krishna 1,290

7) Mahanadi 890

8) Kaveri 760

Borders of INDIA

Border Management

India has 15106.7 KM. of land border running through 92 districts in 17 states and a coastline of 7516.6 KM. touching 13 states and Union Territories . India also has a total of 1197 islands accounting for 2094 KM. of additional coastline . In fact, barring MP, Chhattis-garh , Jharkhand , Delhi , and Haryana , All other states in the country have one or more international borders or a coastline and can be regarded as frontline states from the point of view of borders management .
The length of India’s land borders with
Neighboring countries are:

COUNTRY : Length of Borders

1) Bangladesh 4096.7 KM.
2) China 3488 KM.
3) Pakistan 3323 KM.
4) Nepal 1751 KM.
5) Myanmar 1643 KM.
6) Bhutan 699 KM.
7) Afghanistan 106 KM.

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